PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
Jurisdiction
THE SCHOOL DISTRICTS’ CLAIMS AGAINST TEA AND THE COMMISSIONER WERE NOT RIPE FOR REVIEW
Case citation: Bridgeport ISD v. Williams, __ S.W.3d __, 2014 WL 6130265 (Tex. App. — Austin 2014).
Summary: A number of school districts filed suit against the Commissioner of Education and the Texas Education Agency, challenging the validity of the Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) Guide, arguing that TEA did not have statutory authority to adopt it. Further, ninety-two school districts sought judicial review of preliminary 2012 AYP designation determinations. After unsuccessful appeals before the TEA, these two appeals to state district court were consolidated. TEA and the Commissioner filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the school districts failed to establish that they had “any legal right or privilege that has been interfered with or impaired.” They also challenged the district’s standing to assert claims, raised sovereign immunity, and argued that the districts were seeking an advisory opinion. The trial court entered an order of dismissal, granting the plea to the jurisdiction and the school districts appealed. In May of 2014, the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal in favor of TEA and the Commissioner. [See, Bridgeport ISD v. Williams, S.W.3d , 2014 WL 2191035 (Tex. App. – Austin 2014); Texas School Administrator’s Legal Digest, July/August 2014]. The districts moved for rehearing.
Ruling: The court of appeals denied the districts’ motion for rehearing and issued a new opinion to substitute for its May 2014 ruling, affirming the judgment in favor of TEA and the Commissioner. The appeals court explained that TEA receives federal grants under the federal No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), and then distributes the grants to local school districts. The NCLB requires states to set accountability standards for schools and to monitor compliance by schools and requires the schools to demonstrate “adequate yearly progress.” To comply with this requirement, TEA set accountability standards and performance monitoring for determining Texas schools’ “Adequate Yearly Progress” in accordance with the NCLB. The AYP Guide provides an appeals process for a school district to challenge an AYP designation determination.
In September 2012, most of the school districts administratively appealed their 2012 AYP designation determination, pursuant to the procedure provided in the AYP Guide and sought relief based on their contention that the AYP Guide was an “improperly adopted rule.” In December 2012, the Commissioner denied these appeals, explaining that his decisions were final. Around the same time, the school districts sued TEA and Williams in his official capacity as the Commissioner for injunctive and declaratory relief under section 2001.038 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and section 37.003 of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA). They challenged the validity of the AYP Guide, arguing that TEA did not have statutory authority to adopt it. The districts also asserted claims of ultra vires actions and violations of Article I, section 3 of the Texas Constitution.
Several weeks later, the school districts filed an amended petition to add claims seeking judicial review of the denial of their appeals of their preliminary 2012 AYP designation determinations. The school districts also filed a motion for rehearing with TEA at that time. In March 2013, the school districts filed a separate suit, bringing the same claims as their initial suit. The two suits were consolidated in April 2013. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the TEA and Commissioner’s plea to the jurisdiction without stating the grounds for its ruling and dismissed the districts’ claims.
TEA and the Commissioner argued that the districts’ issues were moot because the United States Department of Education (USDE) granted TEA a waiver in September 2013 from the requirement that it issue AYP designation determinations. A key change resulting from the NCLB waiver was the elimination of the AYP designation. The Commissioner had notified the districts that, with the granting of the NCLB waiver, AYP had been superseded to allow for a more flexible, state-specific approach to identifying schools in need of intervention. TEA also noted that the waiver was conditional until “USDE reviews and approves Texas’s proposed guidelines for teacher and principal evaluation and support systems, which will be submitted in Spring 2014.” The districts argued, however, that their claims are not moot because USDE’s waiver was “an extremely complicated, short–lived, and conditional agreement” that “expires in May, of its own terms.”
The court of appeals observed that the ripeness doctrine “emphasizes the need for a concrete injury for a justiciable claim to be presented” and “examines when [an] action may be brought.” It focuses on whether the case involves “uncertain or contingent” future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Moreover, avoiding premature litigation prevents courts from “entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies” while at the same time serving to “protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.” The appeals court, here, determined that, because the districts’ alleged injury remained contingent, the claims were not ripe for review. The court of appeals, therefore, upheld the trial court’s ruling in favor of the Commissioner and TEA.
WERE THE PARENTS REQUIRED TO TAKE THEIR CASE TO T.E.A. BEFORE GOING TO COURT?
Case citation: Marquez v. Clint ISD, __ S.W.3d __, 2014 WL 4746412 (Tex. App. – El Paso 2014).
Summary: On behalf of their minor children, Sonia Herrera Marquez, Claudia Garcia, and Alicia Gomez filed suit against the Clint Independent School District, alleging violations of the Texas Constitution and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Their suit alleged that the district violated, and continues to violate, the rights and equal rights of their children, and those similarly situated, as granted by the Texas Constitution. According to Parents, the school district’s intra-district funding: (1) is inequitable and disparate; (2) denies equal access and opportunity to some students; (3) fails to meet constitutional or statutory standards: (4) unreasonably renders unequal the opportunities and access to programs and services for students at certain middle and high schools within the school district; (5) thwarts the Legislature’s implementation of its constitutional mandate “to establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools [sic]” for the purpose of guaranteeing a “general diffusion of knowledge … essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people;” (6) fails the Texas Constitution’s mandates of equal rights and equal protection through its differential treatment of students in certain middle and high school communities within the district without a rational basis therefor; and (7) has denied the children, and those similarly situated, access to an equal education and has harmed their educational outcomes.
The parents alleged they were entitled to a declaratory judgment and relief. They also requested temporary and permanent injunctive relief against the district “from failing and refusing to provide their children and those similarly situated with equal education funding for all students at comparable grade levels, appropriately weighted according to the state funding formula.” Noting that their action against the school district “involves intangible constitutional rights to an education and to equal education opportunity that directly affects their lives now and in the future,” the parents claimed that their children and those similarly situated would suffer probable, imminent, immediate, and irreparable injury in the interim for which no compensation may be made absent the imposition of injunctive relief.
In response, the district filed a motion to dismiss and plea to the jurisdiction. The school district asserted that it is immune from suit. According to the district, the parents were required, but had failed, to exhaust administrative remedies available to them. On February 28, 2013, the trial court heard the school district’s motion, found that the parents had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, and granted the school district’s motion to dismiss. The parents then appealed.
Ruling: The appeals court reversed the order dismissing the parents’ suit. The parents argued that the trial court erred in dismissing their action because they were not required to exhaust administrative remedies. According to the parents: (1) they alleged irreparable harm caused by the school district’s disparate funding and sought injunctive relief, which the Commissioner of Education has no authority to grant; (2) they alleged violations of the Texas Constitution, for which the exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required to confer jurisdiction upon a court; and (3) their claims presented pure questions of law, which do not require the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
According to the appeals court, the trial court erred in finding that it was without jurisdiction and dismissed the parents’ action for failing to exhaust administrative remedies. In reaching this conclusion, the appeals court focused on the constitutional nature of parents’ pleadings. The parents did not allege that they were aggrieved by “school laws” in Titles 1 and 2 of the Education Code, did not assert that the actions or decisions of the school district board of trustees violate “school laws” of this state, nor assert any complaint related to any provisions of a written employment contract between the school district and a school district employee. Consequently, the appeals court concluded that Texas Education Code 7.057(a)(1) did not provide the Commissioner of Education with jurisdiction over the parents’ claims. Rather, the parents’ suit presented constitutional claims attacking the school board’s past and ongoing policies or actions, and also presented claims for constitutional violations that were reflected by the school board’s actions. Therefore, resolution of the constitutional issues advanced in the parents’ lawsuit were properly within the jurisdiction of the trial court and not that of the Commissioner of Education. The general rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies under Section 7.057 did not apply to the parents’ claims in this case.
Comments: Readers of this publication are well aware of the lawsuit heading to the Texas Supreme Court over school funding. This case presents the same issue in microcosm, focusing on alleged inequities just within one district. Since the court rules here that the case need not go through T.E.A., it will proceed to the courthouse. We shall see what happens.